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Abstract
We consider product line strategies of duopolistic rms supplying two vertically
di¤erentiated products with non-negativity output constraint and its expectation
on rivals product line reaction. We consider a game in which there exists a het-
erogeneous unit production costs in high quality goods but is homogeneous in low
quality product between rms. We derive equilibria for the game and character-
ize graphically rmsproduct line strategies and the realized prots of both rms
through quality superiority and relative cost e¢ ciency ratios. We also show that
the e¢ cient cost rm earns more than the ine¢ cient rm except for the special
case where both rms specialize in low quality good. We also illustrate that rms
can correctly conjecture the ex ante relationship between the quality superiority of
both goods and the relative cost e¢ ciency ratios of rms on high quality good ex
post in equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
In real economy, there exits oligopolistic competition in the same segment market in which
rms supply vertically di¤erentiated multi-product. In such a market competition, it is
important for each rm to choose its own product line strategies on multi-products under
its expectation on its rivals product line reaction. In Kitamura and Shinkai (2015) pub-
lished in Econ. Lett.), we characterize graphically rmsproduct line strategies through
the quality superiority and the relative cost e¢ ciency of high quality goods ratios between
rms, when each rival rm chooses positive outputs in both a high and low quality goods.
In our previous work, we dont explore equilibrium prots of rms. In real oligopolistic
market, there are some cases in which its rival rm faces with its rival which supplies
each one of vertically di¤erentiated two products ( that is, the rival chooses a single
product line) in a same segment market. Thus, it is crucial for each rm to consider
which product line strategies the rival rm chooses, when it chooses its own best product
line strategies. Furthermore, in our previous study, we analyze the case in which there
exists cost heterogeneity in high quality product but with homogenous cost for low quality
product.
In this paper, we consider product line strategies of duopolistic rms supplying two
vertically di¤erentiated products with non-negativity output constraint and its expecta-
tion on rivals product line reaction. We consider a game in which there is a heterogeneous
in unit production cost of high quality good but is homogeneous in low quality product be-
tween rms. We show that there exist ve nontrivial equilibria in which positive outputs
for any products of the game. We characterize graphically rmsproduct line strategies
through the quality superiority and the cost e¢ ciency of high quality goods between
rms in the equilibrium. Furthermore, we also compare the equilibrium prots of rms
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for the amounts and graphically characterize the relationship of prots of both rms in
the equilibrium through quality superiority and relative cost e¢ ciency ratios.
2 The Model
Suppose there are two rms, i = 1; 2, and each produce two goods (H and L) that di¤er in
terms of quality, where 1 and 2 imply rms 1 and 2 in the duopoly case, respectively. We
assume there is a continuum of consumers characterized by a taste parameter, , which
is uniformly distributed between 0 and r (> 0), with density 1. We further assume that a
consumer of type  2 [0; r];for r > 0. Preferences are standard a la MussaRosen. Thus,
the utility (net benet) of consumer  who buys good  (= H;L) from rm i (= 1; 2) is
given by
Ui() = V   pi i =; 1; 2  = H;L: (1)
Each consumer decides to buy either nothing or one unit of good  from rm i to maximize
his/her surplus.
Let VH and VL denote the quality level of the two goods. Then, the maximum amount
that consumers are willing to pay for each good is assumed VH = VL =  > VL = 1.
Thus, for simplicity, we normalize the quality of the low-quality good as VL = 1 and we
assume the quality of the high-quality good is -fold that of the low-quality good. Good
 (= H;L) is assumed homogeneous for any consumer.
Then, in the same way as in Kitamura and Shinkai (2015), we can derive the following
inverse demand functions:
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8>><>>:
pH = VH(r  QH) QL = (r  QH) QL
pL = VL  QH  QL = 1 QH  QL,
(2)
where Q = qi+ qj and p and qi stand for the price of good  and rm is output
of good , respectively,  = H;L; i; j = 1; 2. Without loss of generality, we set r = 1,
hereafter.
Moreover, suppose that each rm has constant returns to scale and that ciH > ciL =
cjL = cL = 0, where ci is rm is marginal and average cost of good . This implies
that a high-quality good incurs a higher cost of production than a low-quality good does.
Here, without loss of generality, we assume c2H > c1H = 1 > ciL = 0, which means that
rm 1 is more e¢ cient than rm 2 is. Under these assumptions, each rms prot is
dened in the following manner:
i = (pH   ciH)qiH + pLqiL i = 1; 2: (3)
3 Derivation of an Equilibrium
In this section, we derive an equilibrium of Cournot duopoly game in which each rm
can choose its product line and output(s) of two vertically di¤erentiated goods with non-
negativity output constraint and its expectation on rivals product line reaction. After
derivation of the equilibrium, we characterize graphically rmsproduct line strategies
through the quality superiority and the cost e¢ ciency of high quality goods between rms
in the equilibrium.
Firm i(= 1; 2) chooses the output (outputs) for H or L (both) type(s) of product(s) to
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supply that which maximizes this prot function in Cournot fashion under non-negativitiy
output constraints provided that rm j(6= i) chooses any given product line strategy
sj2 Sj  f(0; 0); (+; 0); (0;+); (+;+)g, where (0; 0) implies (qjH = 0; qjL = 0), (+; 0)
implies (qjH > 0; qjL = 0), and so on. Thus, for any given sj2 Sj
max
qiH ;qiL
i = f(1  qiH   qjH)  qiL   qjL   ciH)qiH + (1  qiH   qjH   qiL   qjL)qiL(4)
s:t:qiH  0; qiL  0; i 6= j; i; j = 1; 2.
The necessary and complementary conditions for the above maximization problem are
@i
@qiH
 0; @i
@qiL
 0; (5)
qiH  @i
@qiH
= qiL  @i
@qiL
= 0; (6)
qiH  0; qiL  0, i = 1; 2. (7)
Each rm chooses its product line strategy for two vertically di¤erentiated products,
that is, whether it produces positive (zero) quantities of product H and L for any rival
rms product line strategy.
Note that each inequality @i=@qi  0 in (5) and the correspondent complementary
slackness condition qi  @i=@qi = 0 in (6) imply that if the marginal revenue of rm i
of product (= H;L) is below ( is exactly the same as ) its marginal cost of it, then rm
i does not produce (does produce a positive quantity of) the product, respectively.
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There are 15 cases to be solved according to each rms product line strategies under
its expectation about its rival rms product line strategies except for the trivial case in
which both rms never produce either product, H or L. After some lengthy calculations
and the check of non-negativity constraints of the outputs in each equilibria, we can show
that 10 out of these 15 cases have no equilibrium in the correspondent games. Owing to
limitations of space of the paper, we omit these calculations and proofs of our results.
We observe that the following ve cases have an equilibrium in the corresponding games.
3.1 (Case A) qA1H = q
A
2H = 0; q
A
1L > 0; q
A
2L > 0
In this case, the quality superiority of high quality product H; is too small as compared
with the relative cost e¢ ciency of high quality goods between rms, c2H ; and so both of
rms never produce the product H but produce only low quality product L: A duopoly
market of low quality is realized in the equilibrium. In gure 1, the area IX corresponds
to this case.
qA1H = q
A
2H = 0 < q
A
1L = q
A
2L =
1
3
and 1 <   2, (8)
where the last inequality has to be satised from the necessary condition. From
(2), (3) and (8), the corresponding equilibrium price, prot of each rm are presented
respectively by
pAH =
1
3
(3  2); pAL =
1
3
and
6
A1 = 
A
2 =
1
3
.
3.2 (Case B) qB1L = q
B
2H = 0; q
B
2L > 0; q
B
1H > 0
In this case, each rm specializes to the product with relative cost e¢ ciency. In conse-
quent, two monopoly markets are realized in the equilibrium: the monopoly of rm 1
(2) for the product H (L ). In gure 1, the area VI corresponds to this case. In area
VI, the relative cost ine¢ ciency of high quality good of rm 2, c2H is relatively strong as
compared with ; the quality superiority of high quality product H:
Thus, we obtain
qB1L = q
B
2H = 0; q
B
1H =
1
4  1(2  3); q
B
2L =
1
4  1(+ 1); (9)
4    1
2
(2c2H +
q
4c22H   2c2H + 4);
where the last inequality needs to be satised from the necessary condition. From
(2), (3) and (8), we obtain the corresponding equilibrium price, prot of each rm:
P BH =
(+ 1) (2  1)
4  1 ; P
B
L =
+ 1
4  1
and
B1 =
 (2  3)2
(4  1)2 , 
B
2 =
(+ 1)2
(4  1)2 .
We also see that qB1H   qB2L =  44 1  0, qB1H  qB2L .
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B1   B2 =
1
4  1
 
2   3+ 1 > 0 for 1
2
p
5 +
3
2
< 4 < .
3.3 (Case C) qC1L = 0; q
C
2L > 0; q
C
1H > 0; q
C
2H > 0
In the case C, rm 2 with higher unit cost of high quality product H produces both
products but rm 1 which is e¢ cient in production of product H specializes to product
H. While the market for product H is a duopoly, but the market for product L becomes
monopoly! In gure 1, the areas IV and V correspond to this case. In area IV, the
quality superiority of high quality product  is high as compared with the relative cost
ine¢ ciency of high quality good of rm 2 c2H . Moving down the point in area IV to area
V, the relative quality superiority  reduces and becomes small as compared with the
relative cost ine¢ ciency of good H of rm 2 c2H . Hence substitution of production of
rm 2 occurs from high quality good H to low quality L.
qC1L = 0; q
C
2L =
1
2(  1)c2H ; q
C
1H =
1
3
(+ c2H   2), (10)
qC2H =
1
6(  1)(2
2   4c2H+ c2H   2)
qC1H > q
C
2H ; q
C
2L > 0 and q
C
2H R qC2L ,
1
4
(7c2H +
q
49c22H   8c2H + 16) S , (11)
and
1
2
(2c2H +
q
4c22H   2c2H + 4) < , qC2H > 0 (12)
hold. Furthermore, we obtain
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c2H  2 and  > 4. (13)
For qC1H > 0, the inequality,  > 2   c2H is necessary to hold. This holds, since
c2H  2. The corresponding equilibrium price, prot of each rm are given by
P CH =
1
3
(+ c2H + 1) ; P
C
L =
1
6
(2  c2H + 2)
and
C1 =
(+ c2H   2)2
9
;
C2 =
1
36(  1)(4
3   4(4c2H   1)2 + 4(2c2H   1)(2c2H + 1)  (7c2H   2) (c2H   2)).
If 1
2
(2c2H +
p
4c22H   2c2H + 4) < ; c2H  2, , then C1 > C2 .
3.4 (Case D) qD1L > 0; q
D
2L > 0; q
D
1H > 0; q
D
2H = 0
In this case, contrary to the case C, rm 1 with e¢ cient in production of product H
supplies both product but the ine¢ cient rm 2 specializes to product L. Consequently,
the market for low quality product L becomes a duopoly but the one for high quality
product H is a monopoly. The areas VII and VIII correspond to this case. the relative
superiority of high quality good  is relatively small as compared with the relative cost
ine¢ ciency of high quality good of rm 2, c2H ;especially in case VIII.
qD1L =
1
6(  1)(4  ); q
D
2L =
1
3
; qD1H =
1
(  1)(  2); q
D
2H = 0: (14)
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Because qD1L and q
D
1H are positive values, we have
2 <  < 4.
In addition, we have
qD1L R qD1H ,  S
5
2
and   2c2H ,
where the last inequality has to be held for the necessary condition. From (2), (3)
and (8), the corresponding equilibrium price, prot of each rm are
P DH =
3+ 2
6
; P DL =
1
3
and
D1 =
1
36 (  1)
 
92   32+ 32 , D2 = 19 .
D1  D2 =
1
36  36
 
92   32+ 32 1
9
=
1
4 (  1) (  2)
2 > 0; for   2c2H , 2 <  < 4.
3.5 (Case E) qE1L > 0; q
E
2L > 0; q
E
1H > 0; q
E
2H > 0
In case E, both rms produce both products and both markets become duopoly. In this
case, c2H is so small in comparison with . In Figure 1, this case corresponds to the areas
I, I, II and III. Moving down from area III to I, the ine¢ cient rm 2 of high quality
product H reduces the quantity output of product H.
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qE1L =
1
3(  1)(2  c2H); q
E
2L =
1
3(  1)(2c2H   1); (15)
qE1H =
1
3(  1)(+ c2H   3); q
E
2H =
1
3(  1)(  2c2H):
For qE1L > 0 and q
E
1L > 0,
1 < c2H < 2
is necessary to be held. We observe that qE1H > q
E
2H under this condition. For q
E
1H > 0
and qE2H > 0, we observe that
 > 3  c2H and  > 2c2H
are necessary to be held, respectively. In addition, we obtain
qE1H R qE1L ,  R 5  2c2H , qE2H R qE1L and qE2L R qE1H ,  R c2H + 2
Furthermore, we show that
qE2H R qE2L ,  R 4c2H   1.
Further, we obtain the corresponding equilibrium price, prot of each rm (2), (3)
and (8):
pEH =
1
3
(+ c2H + 1) ; p
E
L =
1
3
,
11
E1 =
1
9(  1)
 
2 + (2c2H   5)+ (c2H   2)(c2H   4)

,
E2 =
1
9(  1)
 
2   (4c2H   1)+ 4c22H   1

.
For 1 < c2H < 2;   2c2H > 1
2
(c2H+3); 
E
1  E2 =
1
3 (  1) (c2H   1) (2  c2H   3) > 0:
Putting the above 5 cases together, we obtain the following proposition. Furthermore,
we can classify the product line strategy of the duopoly game under the rivals nonnegative
output belief in c2H    plane in Figure 1.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Proposition 1 In the duopoly equilibrium of the game under rivals nonnegative
quantities expectation presented above, the next inequalities hold among the outputs of
high-quality good and low quality good of each rm:
0 < qE2H < q
E
1H  qE1L < qE2L
for (c2H ; ) 2 f(c2H ; ) 2 R2++ j  > 2c2H ;   5  2c2H and 1 < c2H < 5
4
g (I),
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0 < qE2H < q
E
1L < q
E
1H < q
E
2L for (c2H ; ) 2
f(c2H ; ) 2 R2++ j  > 2c2H ;  > 5  2c2H ;  < c2H + 2 and 1 < c2H < 2g (I ),
0 < qE1L  qE2H < qE2L < qE1H for (c2H ; ) 2
f(c2H ; ) 2 R2++ j   c2H + 2;  < 4c2H   1; and 1 < c2H < 2g (II ),
0 < qE1L < q
E
2L  qE2H < qE1H for (c2H ; ) 2
f(c2H ; ) 2 R2++ j   4c2H   1; and 1 < c2H < 2g (III ),
qC1L = 0 < q
C
2H < q
C
2L < q
C
1H for (c2H ; ) 2
f(c2H ; ) 2 R2++ j  > 1
4
(7c2H +
q
49c22H   8c2H + 16) > 4; c2H  2g, (IV)
qC1L = 0 < q
C
2L  qC2H < qC1H for (c2H ; ) 2
f(c2H ; ) 2 R2++ j 1
4
(7c2H +
q
49c22H   8c2H + 16) >  
1
2
(2c2H +
q
4c22H   2c2H + 4) > 4
; c2H  2g, (V )
13
qB1H  qB2L > qB1L = qB2H = 0
for (c2H ; ) 2 f(c2H ; ) 2 R2++ j 4    1
2
(2c2H +
q
4c22H   2c2H + 4);  
5
2
(VI ).
qD2L =
1
3
> qD1H > q
D
1L > q
D
2H = 0 when
5
2
<  < 4;   2c2H (VII )
qD2L =
1
3
> qD1L  qD1H > qD2H = 0 when 1 <  
5
2
;   2c2H ; (VIII ).
qA1H = q
A
2H = 0 < q
A
1L = q
A
2L =
1
3
when 1 <   2 (IX ).
where Roman numbers imply the area in c2H    plane in Figure 1, respectively.
Note that the equilibrium output of each rm presented in Proposition 1 at each
equilibrium is that of the duopoly game under its expectation about its rivals nonnegative
output(s).
The result presented in Proposition 1 makes rms conjecture correctly the state of
nature regarding the quality superiority and the relative cost e¢ ciency ratios ex post, by
observing realized equilibrium output strategies in the equilibrium.
Note that we assume c2H > c1H = 1 and VH = VL =  > VL = 1. Thus, the
horizontal and vertical axes variables in Figure 1 imply the relative cost ratio c2H and
quality value ratio . At any point (c2H ; ) in the areas I, I, II, and III in Figure 1,
relative cost ratio c2H is between 1 and 2, so the di¤erence of unit cost of both rms is
small. The equilibrium in the case E above corresponds to these areas. In the areas I, I,
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II, the relative superiority of high quality good  is also not so large, both rms are likely
to supply high- and low-quality goods. However, as the quality value ratio  increases
and becomes su¢ ciently high and the relative cost ratio c2H su¢ ciently low in the area
III , the ine¢ cient rm 2 produces far more of the low-quality good with no production
cost than it does of the high-quality good, which has a higher positive cost. In contrast,
the e¢ cient rm 1 produces moderately more of the high-quality good H than it does
of the low-quality good L, since its production cost for good H is lower than that of its
rival rm. However, its marginal revenue from good H is not high, because its quality
superiority  is not very large. As the point (c2H ; ) moves from Area I to Areas I, II
and III in Figure 1, substitution of production proceeds from the low-quality good to
the high-quality good in both rms. Such substitution of production is stronger for the
e¢ cient rm than for the ine¢ cient one.
This result is consistent with Calzada and Valletti (2012), where the optimal strategy
for a lm studio is to introduce versioning if their goods are not close substitutes for
each other. Thus, when the predominance in quality value of the high-quality good H
is large compared to good L to some extent, we can conclude that they are not close
substitutes for each other. Then, the result in the above proposition conrms that it
would be better for both rms to supply both goods in the market, that is, to obey the
versioning strategy" in Calzada and Valletti (2012).
As at any point (c2H ; ) in the areas IV and V, the relative superiority  is large
as compared with the relative cost ratio c2H , the margin of the e¢ cient rm 1 for high
quality good H is not so large, consequently substitution of production of rm 1 from
good H to good L occurs, so the e¢ cient rm 1 specializes good L with relatively large
margin because of zero unit cost of good L. Moving from the area IV to the area V,
the ine¢ cient rm 2 starts to lose incentive to supply high quality good, rm 2 reduces
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the output of high quality good and increases the output of low quality good instead.
The equilibrium in the case C corresponds to these areas. In the area VI, the relative
superiority  is moderate level, but is smaller than that, and the relative cost ratio c2H
is larger than the level of it in the areas, IV and V. Hence, rm 2 with the ine¢ cient
in production technology for high quality good stops producing good H and specializes
in low quality good L. Two monopoly markets of both goods appear in this case. The
equilibrium in the case B corresponds to this area. As the relative superiority  reduces
from the point (c2H ; ) from the area VII and VIII, the e¢ cient rm in production for
high quality good reduces the output of good H and augment the output of low quality
good. Thus substitution of production from high quality to low quality good advances
steadily. At last, the equilibrium in the case A, thus in the area IX, rm 1 ceases to
produce high quality good H and specializes in low quality good. In consequent, the
market in the equilibrium becomes a duopoly of low quality good!
Next we provide a proposition on the equilibrium prots of rms for ve nontrivial
equilibria.
Proposition 2 In the duopoly equilibrium of the game under rivals nonnegative
quantities expectation presented above, the next inequalities hold among the prots of
each rm:
If 1 <   2, c2H  1, then A1 = A2 .
If 4    1
2
(2c2H +
p
2(2c22H   c2H + 2)), then B1 > B2 .
If 1
2
(2c2H +
p
4c22H   2c2H + 4) < ; c2H  2, then C1 > C2 .
If   2c2H , 2 <  < 4, then D1 > D2 .
Suppose that 1 < c2H < 2. If 1 < c2H < 2 and   2c2H , then E1 > E2 .
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[Insert Figure 2 here]
Note that the cost-e¢ cient rm on high quality product earns more than the cost-
ine¢ cient rm at the equilibria in the cases except for cases A.
In the case A, taking the results of Proposition 1 and 2 into consideration together,
in this area, we see that the relative superiority of high quality good  is too small as
compared with both of unit costs for high quality goodH, so both rms specialize to good
L and the market for good L becomes Cournot duopoly. Hence, two rmsequilibrium
prots are exactly same.
4 Conjecture on the Relative Superiority and the
Relative Cost Ratios
In the preceding section, we derived the equilibria of duopoly games in which each rm
can choose its product line and output(s) of two vertically di¤erentiated goods with non-
negativity constraints and its expectation on its rivals product lie reaction. When we
drive the equilibria, we assume that the relative superiority ratio  and the relative cost
ratio c2H are common knowledge with both rms. However, in a real economy or a
market, rms may not know  and c2H precisely. In this section, accordingly, we discuss
about ex post rmsconjecture on the relative superiority and the relative cost ratios 
and c2H from the realized outputs outcome in the equilibrium.
Suppose that both rms are su¢ ciently rational, so they can formulate our model
and can solve it. Then, by observing the realized equilibrium their outputs levels in the
market and referring proposition 1 and Figure 1, they can conjecture which equilibrium
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has been realized out of in the cases A, B, C, D and to which area of the point (c2H ; )
that they are facing belongs out of nine areas I; II;    ; IX.
For example, suppose that both rs observe that they supply both goods H and L
in the market. Then, from proposition 1, they can nd that the equilibrium they face
with is the one in the case E. Further, they also nd that the realized outputs of the
goods satisfy the inequality 0 < qEiL  qEjH < qEjL < qEiH . Then, referring proposition 1
and Figure 1, they faces with the state point of (c2H ; ) exactly belongs to the area II,
and the relative cost ratio c2H belongs to the interval (1; 2) and the relative superiority 
belongs to the interval [5=2; 7]. Thus, they can learn that the di¤erence unit cost of good
H between own rm and rival is relatively small and their consumersevaluation on the
superiority ratio  of good H to L is between two point ve times and seven times.
Next, say, if they nd that only a rm supplies good H but does not good L and its
rival rm supplies only good L by observation the realized equilibrium outputs. Then,
from proposition 1, they can nd that the equilibrium they face with is the one in the case
B! The can also learn from Figure 1 that the state point of (c2H ; ) exactly belongs to the
area IX. So both rms learn from this fact that the cost ratio c2H is large as compared
with the relative superiority of good H, !
Thus, they can conjecture on the state of the relative superiority and the relative cost
ratio pair (c2H ; ) they face with, from the realized equilibrium outputs outcome!
5 Conclusion
In this study, we consider duopoly game with two vertically di¤erentiated products under
nonnegative output constraints and its expectation about its rivals product line strate-
gies. We derive an equilibrium for the game and characterize graphically rmsproduct
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line strategies and the realized prots of both rms in each equilibria through quality
superiority and relative cost e¢ ciency ratios.
We also show that the rm with cost e¢ ciency for high quality good earns more than
the rm with ine¢ cient cost except for the special case in which the relative superiority
of high quality good  is too small as compared with both of unit costs for high quality
good H, so both rms specialize to good L and the market for good L becomes Cournot
duopoly. In this case, o¤ course, both rmsprot is exactly same. We also illustrate that
rms can correctly conjecture the ex ante relationship between the quality superiority of
both goods and the relative cost e¢ ciency ratios of rms on high quality good ex post
in equilibrium by observing the realized equilibrium outputs and re¤ering the results on
the equilibrium outputs in proposition 1 and Figure 1.
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